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ABSTRACT: The failure of liberal internationalism in the post–
Cold War period requires the United States to adopt a clear-eyed
approach to competition that promotes regional balances of power,
emphasizes reciprocity, and creates mission-driven coalitions.

W

riting in Foreign Affairs last year, then presidential candidate
Joe Biden promised to “address the world as it is” in his
effort to restore American leadership.1 President Biden’s
team faces an uphill battle as they translate the president’s vision into
policy. The emergence of powerful rivals coupled with the erosion of
US capabilities has led to a decline of American agency in the world.
Ultimately this trend stems from a series of long-standing illusions about
the sources of American power and what it can reasonably accomplish.
Since the end of the Cold War, US policymakers have been beguiled
by a set of illusions about world order. Contrary to the optimistic
predictions made in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, widespread
political liberalization and the growth of transnational organizations
have not tempered rivalries among countries. Likewise globalization
and economic interdependence have not been unalloyed goods; often
they have generated unanticipated inequalities and vulnerabilities.
And although the proliferation of digital technologies has increased
productivity and brought other benefits, it has also eroded the US
military’s advantages and posed challenges to democratic societies.
Given these new realities, Washington cannot simply return to the
comfortable assumptions of the past. The world has moved beyond
the unipolar moment of the post–Cold War period and into an age of
interdependence and competition calling for different policies and tools.
To navigate this new era properly, the United States must let go of old
illusions, move past the myths of liberal internationalism, and reconsider
its views about the nature of the world order.

A Promise Unfulfilled

As the twentieth century drew to a close, waves of global
democratization inspired optimism in the West. Ultimately a consensus
1. This article is adapted from Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion: Trump and
the World as It Is,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/americas/2020-08-11/end-american-illusion. Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Why America Must
Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy after Trump,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again.
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formed that a convergence on liberal democracy would lead to a stable
international political order. As the Soviet Union withered and the
Cold War ended, US President George H. W. Bush called for a “new
world order,” a “Pax Universalis” founded on liberal values, democratic
governance, and free markets.2 Several years later, US President Bill
Clinton’s 1996 National Security Strategy articulated a policy of
engagement and democratic enlargement that would improve “the
prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution, and greater
dignity and hope for the people of the world.”3
This presumption of liberal convergence motivated the decision to
allow China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001. As Clinton
said at the time, such an opening would have “a profound impact on
human rights and political liberty.”4 The rest of the world would get
access to Chinese markets and cheap imports, and China would get
the chance to bring prosperity to hundreds of millions of its citizens,
which many in Washington believed would improve the prospects for
democratization—a win-win situation.
But China had no intention of converging with the West. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) never intended to play by the West’s
rules; it was determined to control markets rather than open them and
did so by keeping its exchange rate artificially low, providing unfair
advantages to state-owned enterprises, and erecting regulatory barriers
against non-Chinese companies. Officials in both the George W. Bush
and the Obama administrations worried about China’s intentions. But
fundamentally they remained convinced the United States needed to
engage with China to strengthen the rules-based international system,
and that China’s economic liberalization would ultimately lead to
political liberalization. Instead, China has taken advantage of economic
interdependence to grow its economy and enhance its military, thereby
ensuring the long-term strength of the CCP.
While China and other actors subverted the liberal convergence
overseas, economic globalization was failing to meet expectations at
home. Proponents of globalization claimed in an economy lubricated
by free trade, consumers would benefit from access to cheaper goods,
lost manufacturing jobs would be replaced by better jobs in the
growing service industry, foreign direct investment would flow to
every sector, and companies everywhere would become more efficient
and innovative. Organizations such as the World Trade Organization,
meanwhile, would help manage this freer and more integrated world
(never mind its 22,000 pages of regulations).
2. Reuters, “MIDEAST DIPLOMACY; Excerpts from Bush’s Address to General Assembly:
For a ‘Pax Universalis,’ ” New York Times, September 24, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/09
/24/world/mideast-diplomacy-excerpts-bush-s-address-general-assembly-for-pax-universalis.html.
3. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC:
The White House, February 1996), https://fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm.
4. “Chinese Politics and the WTO: No Change: Hopes of Sparking Political Change Have
Come to Nothing So Far,” Economist, December 10, 2011, https://www.economist.com/asia/2011
/12/10/no-change.
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But the promise that globalization’s rising tide would lift all boats
went unfulfilled: some rose to extreme heights, some stagnated, and
others simply sank. Liberal convergence was not in fact win-win; there
were winners and losers. A populist backlash against this reality caught
elites off guard. This reaction intensified as malfeasance on Wall Street
and the US Federal Reserve’s misguided monetary policies helped bring
about the 2008 global financial crisis. The generous bailouts banks and
financial firms received in its wake convinced many Americans that
corporate and political elites were gaming the system—a theme Donald
Trump would seize on in his 2016 presidential campaign.

Primacy Denied

Although liberal internationalism encouraged interdependence
and multilateralism, it also rested on a faith in Washington’s ability
to maintain indefinitely the uncontested military superiority the
United States enjoyed after the Cold War. Today, however, US military
dominance is challenged in virtually every domain. The United States
is no longer able to operate freely in the traditional spheres of land,
sea, and air, nor in newer ones such as outer space and cyberspace.
The spread of new technologies and weapon systems and the pursuit
of asymmetric strategies by adversaries have limited the ability of the
US military to find and strike targets, supply and safeguard its forces
abroad, freely navigate the seas, control sea lines of communication,
and protect the homeland.
In the 1990s, space and cyberspace emerged as new domains for
strategic competition, and 30 years later the United States finds itself
challenged in both areas. America’s dependence on the domain of space
for its myriad military and intelligence assets make the United States
vulnerable to the potent anti-satellite weapon systems now fielded by
China, Russia, and other states. Likewise in cyberspace, hardware and
software vulnerabilities have emerged across military supply chains,
potentially reducing the effectiveness of important platforms. In 2018,
General David Goldfein, the US Air Force’s chief of staff, described
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as “a computer that happens to fly”—and
thus, like all computers, it is vulnerable to cyberattacks.5
At the same time, bureaucratic requirements have made it harder
for the military to innovate. More than 20 years passed from when the
Joint Strike Fighter program was envisioned to when the first combat
squadron of F-35s was declared operational. The military demands
unrealistically high levels of performance, which defense companies,
hungry for contracts, promise to deliver. Former US Defense Secretary
Robert Gates has bemoaned the armed forces’ unwillingness to settle
for solutions that could actually be built and fielded in a reasonable
time frame.
5. Valeria Insinna, “Inside America’s Dysfunctional Trillion-Dollar Fighter-Jet Program,” New
York Times Magazine, August 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/magazine/f35-joint
-strike-fighter-program.html.
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In addition, America’s adversaries have developed so-called antiaccess/area-denial weapons systems that reduce Washington’s ability to
project power in key regions. China, for example, has developed and
modernized its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and has invested
heavily in technologies to improve its conventional forces. Russia has
built an array of exotic “doomsday weapons” and low-yield tactical
nuclear weapons, and smaller rivals such as Iran and North Korea
continue to develop and refine their nuclear programs. Despite visions
of a world in which no one could challenge American force, the era of
US military dominance proved to be relatively short.

Orwell’s Nightmare

Misplaced faith in the advantages of new technologies was not
confined to military affairs. As the digital revolution began, policymakers
and business leaders were optimistic these technologies would accelerate
the spread of liberal democratic values—so that “the age of information
can become the age of liberation,” as President George H. W. Bush
put it in 1991.6 A few years later, Clinton predicted in the twenty-first
century “liberty [would] spread by cell phone and cable modem.” 7
Over time, however, it has become clear the same technologies that
connect and empower people can also imperil freedom and openness
and limit the right to be left alone—all elements of a flourishing
democracy. Authoritarian countries have deployed digital technologies
to control their citizens. The CCP has developed the most sophisticated
surveillance system in the world, using facial and voice recognition
technologies and DNA sequencing to create a social credit system that
monitors China’s 1.4 billion people and rewards or punishes them based
on their perceived loyalty to the party-state.
These practices are not limited to authoritarian governments,
partially because Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, has
exported surveillance tools that use artificial intelligence (AI) to 49
other countries.8 But democracies have also adopted these technologies
without Chinese assistance; according to the Carnegie Endowment’s
AI Global Surveillance Index, virtually all the countries in the G-20
have deployed AI-enabled surveillance technology, including facial
recognition programs.9 Meanwhile, even as the CCP banned Twitter
6. George H. W. Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly by President
George H. W. Bush” (address, UN General Assembly, New York City, September 23, 1991),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207269.htm.
7. “Clinton’s Words on China: Trade Is the Smart Thing,” New York Times, March 9, 2000,
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/world/clinton-s-words-on-china-trade-is-the-smart
-thing.html.
8. Ross Anderson, “The Panopticon Is Already Here: Xi Jinping Is Using Artificial Intelligence
to Enhance His Government’s Totalitarian Control—and He’s Exporting This Technology to
Regimes around the Globe,” Atlantic, September 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine
/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/.
9. Steven Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, September 17, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global
-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847.

Prospectives 2021: US National Security Strategy

Schadlow 89

in its own country, Beijing uses the platform to conduct disinformation
campaigns abroad aimed at weakening democracies from within.

Global Governance

A final illusion that absorbed US policymakers was the idea
Washington could depend on international organizations to help
it confront major challenges and that these institutions, with the
aid of American leadership, would provide for the emergence of
global governance.
This view presumed since other countries were progressing
inexorably toward liberal democracy, they would share many of
Washington’s goals and would play by Washington’s rules. This belief
tended to minimize the importance of national sovereignty and the fact
countries differ in how they organize their own communities. Even
among democracies, there exists a high degree of variation when it
comes to cultural, institutional, and political values.
Nevertheless, international institutions grew more expansive and
ambitious. In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s
An Agenda for Peace envisioned a world in which the United Nations
would maintain world peace, protect human rights, and promote social
progress through expanding peacekeeping missions. Between 1989 and
1994, the organization authorized 20 peacekeeping missions—more
than the total number of missions it had carried out during the previous
four decades.
Mission creep extended to individual agencies as well. The World
Health Organization (WHO)—created in 1948 to prevent the spread
of infectious diseases—pioneered great accomplishments such as the
eradication of smallpox. But over the years its scope grew dramatically.
By 2000 the World Health Organization had begun to issue warnings
on everything from food safety to cellular phone usage to air quality.
This tendency spread staff and resources too thin, crippling the
organization’s ability to respond to genuine crises such as the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic. The institution’s robust defense of China’s
response to the pandemic also demonstrated the CCP had used its clout
to co-opt the WHO rather than support its missions.

Looking Ahead

Over the past four years these assumptions, long cherished in
Washington, have been shown to be faulty. America has left behind
the halcyon days of liberal internationalism and the unipolar moment
and entered an era of strategic rivalry. As President Biden crafts his
policy agenda, it would be a mistake to return to the flawed premises of
a bygone era. Great power competition will remain a central feature of
the international environment for the foreseeable future, and economic
interdependence does not obviate this reality. Whatever the term of art—
academics and pundits love to debate terms and definitions—several key
features of great power competition will endure. States with sufficient
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power and resources will remain at the core of the international system,
and states field military forces, provide economic aid, and emit carbon.
Great power competition will determine how we live domestically and
internationally, because the more powerful states—those that can exert
their influence more effectively—are able to set the rules of the road.
And we will be directly affected by those who determine those rules.
Today’s multidimensional rivalries will not end in conventional
victories. More broadly, policymakers and strategists need to move past
their emphases on achieving particular end states, since that springs
from a mechanistic and ahistorical view of how politics works. In reality
as the historian Michael Howard argued, human acts create new sets
of circumstances that, in turn, require new judgments and decisions.10
Competition persists because geopolitics is eternal. A main objective
of US strategy, therefore, should be to prevent the accumulation of
activities and trends that harm US interests and values rather than to
pursue grand projects such as dictating how China or other countries
should govern themselves. This strategy requires the United States
craft policies that aim to maintain regional balances of power and deter
aggression by revisionist powers.
Those who favor restraint or retrenchment will be reluctant to
embrace the idea of constant competition because they tend to discount
the aspirations of other powers. If the United States is restrained, the
argument goes, then others will follow suit. But the patterns of history
suggest otherwise. Others will be reluctant to accept the idea of a
rolling end state because they remain convinced the arc of history is
progressing toward a liberal convergence, and they view the push and
pull of a competitive world as overly aggressive and likely to lead to war.
Recognizing the centrality of competition does not mean favoring
the militarization of US foreign policy nor does it mean a drive to war.
A wider acceptance of the competitive nature of geopolitics requires
a foundation of military power, but this acceptance also accentuates
the need for diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft. Precisely
because so much of today’s international competition happens below
the threshold of military conflict, civilian agencies need to take the lead
in maintaining order and shaping a landscape favorable to US interests
and values. But civilian agencies can only adopt this leadership role once
the mindset and culture of all US government agencies change to allow
for a broader recognition of the competition now underway.
Going forward, US foreign policy success will hinge on a cleareyed approach to cooperation. Rather than viewing cooperation with
other countries as an end in itself, policymakers should recognize it as a
means to crafting a stronger competitive strategy. Genuine cooperation
requires reciprocity. Reciprocity means urging other powers to take
more responsibility for their own security and contribute more to the
strength of the US-led order. As a result of the Trump administration’s
10. Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
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pressure on NATO allies, between 2016 and 2018, defense spending
by other member states increased by $43 billion, and NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg has predicted by 2024 such spending will
increase by another $400 billion.11
In the economic domain reciprocity also means preventing other
countries from taking advantage of American goodwill, including
the requirement that China and other countries open their markets
to US products and services to maintain access to American markets.
Reciprocity also entails no longer tolerating Beijing’s unfair practices,
such as forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft.
Experts estimate that since 2013, the United States has suffered over
$1.2 trillion in economic damage as a result of these abuses—the
“greatest transfer of wealth in history.”12 Margrethe Vestager, executive
vice president of the European Commission for a Europe Fit for the
Digital Age, perhaps put it best when she expressed the essence of
reciprocity in 2020: “ ‛Where I grew up in the Western part of Denmark,
if you invite people over and they don’t invite you back, eventually you
stop’ inviting them.”13
In addition Washington needs to accept that global problems are
not necessarily best solved by global institutions. This viewpoint will
not be popular over the next four years. But as the WHO’s failure to
combat COVID-19 demonstrates, international organizations are
accountable primarily to internal bureaucracies and nation-state clients,
rather than to external constituencies. Such institutions can play useful
roles as conveners and centers for information sharing, but they lack
the operational capacity to act at scale; bureaucratic complexity prevents
them from accomplishing broader missions.
Reconsidering global governance does not require rejecting liberal
principles or abandoning an order based on them. But because only a
handful of countries are committed to those principles, the goal should
be to foster what the scholar Paul Miller has described as a “smaller,
deeper liberal order” of industrialized democracies that would defend
liberal values and serve strategic and economic purposes.14 The focus
might be on creating mission-driven coalitions—as Biden’s team
has suggested—that could construct redundant supply chains, fund
research in emerging technologies, promote fair and reciprocal trade,
and cooperate on security issues. Such coalitions would be open to new
members provided they shared US interests and values and could bring
capabilities to bear on key problems.
11. “NATO Secretary General Announces Increased Defence Spending by Allies,” NATO,
November 29, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_171458.htm.
12. Josh Rogin, “NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the ‘Greatest Transfer of Wealth in
History,’ ” The Cable, Foreign Policy, July 9, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chief
-cybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history/.
13. Ryan Heath, “EU Pushing Ahead with Digital Tax Despite U.S. Resistance, Top Official
Says,” POLITICO, June 23, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/23/eu-digital-tax
-united-states-336496.
14. Paul Miller, “Make the Free World Free Again: It’s Time for a Smaller, Deeper Liberal
Order,” Dispatch, June 9, 2020, https://thedispatch.com/p/make-the-free-world-free-again.
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Washington also needs to refresh its thinking on political economy
and improve the capacity of US government agencies to address the
interplay of politics and economics. The United States will never be able
to integrate its economic policies and political strategies as China does.
But Washington should invest more in economic intelligence and make
it easier to share such information across departments and agencies by
establishing a national center for economic intelligence, perhaps modeled
on the National Counterterrorism Center, as the scholar Anthony Vinci
has advocated.15
Moreover, the US government must counter China’s massive
investments in research and development in emerging technologies.
Congress must fund public and private sector research in AI, highperformance computing, synthetic biology, and other strategically
important technology sectors. And the State Department should also
put economics front and center by giving economic officers more
responsibility at embassies and by opening more consulates around the
world to improve business and commercial relationships.
The goals of the liberal international order were laudable—and,
in many cases, they were achieved against daunting odds. The world
is safer, more prosperous, and more just than it once was. But the
unexpected consequences of globalization and the unfulfilled promises
of global governance cannot be overlooked. Liberal internationalists
have a penchant for prioritizing processes, including multilateralism
and globalization, over tangible objectives. In order to fulfill President
Biden’s “build back better” agenda, his administration must resist these
temptations. Pursuing the illusions of liberal internationalism at the
expense of US interests will hasten, not reverse, American decline. In
a world of great power competition, economic inequality, and dazzling
technological capabilities, where ideologies as well as pathogens spread
with viral ferocity, the stakes are too high and the consequences too dire
simply to stick with what worked in the past and hope for the best.

15. Anthony Vinci, “Competitive Climate: America Must Counter China by Investing in
Economic Intelligence,” National Interest, February 4, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature
/competitive-climate-america-must-counter-china-investing-economic-intelligence-120356.

